

# Targeted consultation assessing the adequacy of macroprudential policies for non-bank financial intermediation (NBFi)

Fields marked with \* are mandatory.

## Introduction

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### Setting the scene

**Non-Bank Financial Intermediation (NBFi) comprises very diverse financial sectors** including regulated entities such as asset management companies and investment funds, non-bank investment firms, pension funds, insurance companies, and unregulated entities, such as family offices and supply chain finance companies<sup>[1]</sup>. In autumn 2023, non-bank financial intermediaries (NBFis) accounted for roughly €42.9 trillion (41% of EU total financial assets<sup>[2]</sup>), while banks' assets accounted for roughly EUR 38 trillion (36% of EU's total financial assets). Together with entities (NBFis), capital markets are also a key component of NBFi and have grown over the years in Europe and globally to several multiples of global GDP.

In response to major events in recent years (e.g. the dash-for-cash in March 2020 and the UK gilt crisis in 2022<sup>[3]</sup>), **financial stability concerns about NBFi have emerged in international policy discussions and with initiatives in a number of non-EU and EU jurisdictions**. This consultation, therefore, seeks to gather stakeholders' views on these international developments to inform our macroprudential stance on NBFi. In particular, the Financial Stability Board (FSB), the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO), and jurisdictions, such as the US and the UK, have put forward consultations on assessing gaps in the macroprudential framework for NBFis, or have announced or implemented various initiatives for NBFi (e.g. money market funds reforms<sup>[4]</sup>). The FSB's work programme has been advancing in key areas for NBFi, such as leverage, margin preparedness and vulnerabilities for open-ended funds. IOSCO also consulted on anti-dilution Liquidity Management Tools (LMTs) and is progressing work in the area of private finance. The Central Bank of Ireland (CBI) has published a [consultation paper on a holistic approach to macroprudential policies in the investment funds sector](#). CBI has adopted two macroprudential measures under Article 25 of the [Alternative Investment Funds Directive \(AIFMD\)](#): a [leverage limit for Irish property funds introduced in 2022](#), and a yield buffer to mitigate leverage of GBP-denominated [Liability-Driven Investment \(LDI\) funds \(being adopted also by the Luxembourg market authority, CSSF\)](#).

Nonetheless, NBFi is also a source of financial diversification and so resilience in itself. In the context of the [capital markets union \(CMU\)](#), stable and integrated capital markets are **key sources of funding** for the economy and complement traditional bank lending, while they also provide tools to manage financial and non-financial risks. **NBFis and capital markets thus play a pivotal role in fostering the diversity of financial markets structure and contributing to the resilience of the financial system through private risk sharing and reduced overreliance on**

**traditional (relationship) bank lending.** Over the years, the European Union (EU) has introduced several regulations and directives governing activities of different NBFIs and markets, in some instances providing macroprudential tools that have been tailored to specific NBFIs sectors (see section 2). Moreover, since the global financial crisis in 2008, banking reforms have gradually tightened prudential requirements and this can have (directly or indirectly) restricted the size and scope of activities performed by banks, creating opportunities for NBFIs to expand their activities in areas that were largely performed by banks.

## Objectives of the consultation and target audience

**The objective of this consultation is to seek stakeholders' view on the adequacy of the macroprudential framework for NBFIs with the intent not to revisit recent legislative agreements (e.g. [Solvency II review](#), EMIR 3).**

Article 513 of [Regulation \(EU\) No 575/2013 \(CRR\)](#) requires the Commission to review the EU macroprudential framework, including how authorities in the EU can be mandated with tools to address new emerging systemic risks arising from credit institutions' exposures to NBFIs. In its [recent report on the macroprudential review](#), in light of the emerging vulnerabilities in the NBFIs sectors, the Commission announced the intention to go beyond the legal basis in CRR and collect more evidence on the effectiveness and consistency of macroprudential policies for NBFIs in the EU, focusing in particular on:

- Evaluating the effectiveness of the existing macroprudential tools and supervisory arrangements in achieving their purpose
- Considering repurposing or reviewing existing microprudential and reporting tools (e.g., their activation/trigger and design)
- Assessing, if necessary, the possibility to introduce new macroprudential tools, as well as tools to improve EU-wide coordination

Commission services will use the information gathered in this consultation to inform the policy planning of the upcoming 2024-2029 College of Commissioners.

## Responding to this consultation

Responses to this consultation are expected to be supported by **qualitative and quantitative data** and accompanied by **specific views on potential policy interventions**.

**Targeted stakeholders in this consultation** include primarily EU institutions and bodies, national authorities, including national competent authorities (NCAs) that supervise NBFIs (as defined above) and markets, central banks and the NBFIs industry. All stakeholders are nonetheless invited to respond to the questions set out below. Please note that some questions may indicate that feedback is particularly sought from specific types of stakeholders.

The consultation paper aims, first, to identify vulnerabilities and risks of NBFIs and map the existing macroprudential framework for NBFIs (sections 1 and 2). Second, it seeks to gather feedback on current challenges to macroprudential supervision and discuss areas for further improvements (sections 3 to 6).

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<sup>1</sup> The [ESRB also includes an assessment of the crypto-asset ecosystem in the NBFIs monitor](#), as it "may engage in types of financial intermediation that lead to similar vulnerabilities and expose them to similar risks". The [FSB defines "the NBFIs sector"](#) as "a broad measure of all non-bank financial entities, composed of all financial institutions that are not central banks, banks or public financial institutions." This [categorisation also includes financial market infrastructure under the category of 'market intermediaries'](#). Nonetheless, the [FSB also identified a 'narrow measure' for NBFIs](#), which is not based on entities, but as a bank-like activity measure.

<sup>2</sup> ECB Datawarehouse. Total financial assets include assets held by central banks.

<sup>3</sup> The [FSB pointed at the significant contribution of NBFIs to the 'dash for cash' during the March 2020 COVID crisis](#), especially via spikes in “redemptions from investment funds, margin calls [by market operators] resulting from increased volatility, and the need of some non-banks to unwind leveraged positions.” Similarly, in September 2022, the quick rise in interest rates of UK Gilts (and subsequent fall in prices) sparked large margin calls in the pension funds sector, especially in the UK. In particular, pension funds pursuing Liability-Driven (LDI) strategies led to a major sell-off of UK Gilts, which in turn [caused the Bank of England to intervene with a massive asset purchase programme](#). Moreover, the market stress caused by COVID in March 2020 revealed that Money Market Funds (MMFs) can be susceptible to runs by investors (implying a so called first-mover advantage) that can exacerbate liquidity shocks, as MMFs have to sell their assets to fund outflows. It is important to note that, despite the run, especially on USD-denominated funds, MMFs in the European Union were able to withstand such large outflows. This situation was also caused by structural illiquidity in underlying short-term funding markets (e.g. commercial paper). See [ESRB recommendation](#)

<sup>4</sup> On 28 September 2023, the Bank of England also announced a new monetary policy action with the plan to create a new liquidity tool for NBFIs, which will initially cover insurance and pension funds and may potentially be extended to all NBFIs that meet certain eligibility (ex-ante resilience) requirements. [Read "A journey of 1000 miles begins with a single step: filling gaps in the central bank liquidity toolkit" - speech by Andrew Hauser, Bank of England.](#)

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**Please note:** In order to ensure a fair and transparent consultation process **only responses received through our online questionnaire will be taken into account** and included in the report summarising the responses. Should you have a problem completing this questionnaire or if you require particular assistance, please contact [fisma-nbfi-consult@ec.europa.eu](mailto:fisma-nbfi-consult@ec.europa.eu).

More information on

- [this consultation](#)
- [the consultation document](#)
- [macroprudential policies for non-bank financial intermediation \(NBFIs\)](#)
- [the protection of personal data regime for this consultation](#)

## About you

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### \* Language of my contribution

- Bulgarian
- Croatian
- Czech
- Danish
- Dutch
- English
- Estonian
- Finnish
- French
- German
- Greek

- Hungarian
- Irish
- Italian
- Latvian
- Lithuanian
- Maltese
- Polish
- Portuguese
- Romanian
- Slovak
- Slovenian
- Spanish
- Swedish

\* I am giving my contribution as

- Academic/research institution
- Business association
- Company/business
- Consumer organisation
- EU citizen
- Environmental organisation
- Non-EU citizen
- Non-governmental organisation (NGO)
- Public authority
- Trade union
- Other

\* First name

Jonathan

\* Surname

Vydt

\* Email (this won't be published)

j.vydt@epra.com

### \* Organisation name

255 character(s) maximum

EPRA (European Public Real Estate Association)

### \* Organisation size

- Micro (1 to 9 employees)
- Small (10 to 49 employees)
- Medium (50 to 249 employees)
- Large (250 or more)

### Transparency register number

255 character(s) maximum

Check if your organisation is on the [transparency register](#). It's a voluntary database for organisations seeking to influence EU decision-making.

09307393718-06

### \* Country of origin

Please add your country of origin, or that of your organisation.

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- Australia
- Austria
- Azerbaijan
- Bahamas
- Bahrain
- Bangladesh
- Barbados
- Belarus
- Belgium
- Belize
- Benin
- Bermuda
- Bhutan
- Bolivia
- Bonaire Saint Eustatius and Saba
- Bosnia and Herzegovina
- Botswana
- Bouvet Island
- Brazil
- British Indian Ocean Territory
- British Virgin Islands
- Brunei
- Bulgaria
- Burkina Faso
- Fiji
- Finland
- France
- French Guiana
- French Polynesia
- French Southern and Antarctic Lands
- Gabon
- Georgia
- Germany
- Ghana
- Gibraltar
- Greece
- Greenland
- Grenada
- Guadeloupe
- Guam
- Guatemala
- Guernsey
- Guinea
- Guinea-Bissau
- Guyana
- Haiti
- Heard Island and McDonald Islands
- Honduras
- Mauritania
- Mauritius
- Mayotte
- Mexico
- Micronesia
- Moldova
- Monaco
- Mongolia
- Montenegro
- Montserrat
- Morocco
- Mozambique
- Myanmar/Burma
- Namibia
- Nauru
- Nepal
- Netherlands
- New Caledonia
- New Zealand
- Nicaragua
- Niger
- Nigeria
- Niue
- Norfolk Island
- Slovakia
- Slovenia
- Solomon Islands
- Somalia
- South Africa
- South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands
- South Korea
- South Sudan
- Spain
- Sri Lanka
- Sudan
- Suriname
- Svalbard and Jan Mayen
- Sweden
- Switzerland
- Syria
- Taiwan
- Tajikistan
- Tanzania
- Thailand
- The Gambia
- Timor-Leste
- Togo
- Tokelau

- Burundi
- Cambodia
- Cameroon
- Canada
- Cape Verde
- Cayman Islands
- Central African Republic
- Chad
- Chile
- China
- Christmas Island
- Clipperton
- Cocos (Keeling) Islands
- Colombia
- Comoros
- Congo
- Cook Islands
- Costa Rica
- Côte d'Ivoire
- Croatia
- Cuba
- Curaçao
- Cyprus
- Czechia
- Hong Kong
- Hungary
- Iceland
- India
- Indonesia
- Iran
- Iraq
- Ireland
- Isle of Man
- Israel
- Italy
- Jamaica
- Japan
- Jersey
- Jordan
- Kazakhstan
- Kenya
- Kiribati
- Kosovo
- Kuwait
- Kyrgyzstan
- Laos
- Latvia
- Lebanon
- Northern Mariana Islands
- North Korea
- North Macedonia
- Norway
- Oman
- Pakistan
- Palau
- Palestine
- Panama
- Papua New Guinea
- Paraguay
- Peru
- Philippines
- Pitcairn Islands
- Poland
- Portugal
- Puerto Rico
- Qatar
- Réunion
- Romania
- Russia
- Rwanda
- Saint Barthélemy
- Saint Helena
- Ascension and Tristan da Cunha
- Tonga
- Trinidad and Tobago
- Tunisia
- Turkey
- Turkmenistan
- Turks and Caicos Islands
- Tuvalu
- Uganda
- Ukraine
- United Arab Emirates
- United Kingdom
- United States
- United States Minor Outlying Islands
- Uruguay
- US Virgin Islands
- Uzbekistan
- Vanuatu
- Vatican City
- Venezuela
- Vietnam
- Wallis and Futuna
- Western Sahara
- Yemen
- Zambia

- Democratic Republic of the Congo
- Lesotho
- Saint Kitts and Nevis
- Zimbabwe
- Denmark
- Liberia
- Saint Lucia

\* Field of activity or sector (if applicable)

- Accounting
- Auditing
- Banking
- Credit rating agencies
- Insurance
- Pension provision
- Investment management (e.g. hedge funds, private equity funds, venture capital funds, money market funds, securities)
- Market infrastructure operation (e.g. CCPs, CSDs, Stock exchanges)
- Social entrepreneurship
- Other
- Not applicable

\* Please specify your activity field(s) or sector(s)

European publicly listed property companies

The Commission will publish all contributions to this public consultation. You can choose whether you would prefer to have your details published or to remain anonymous when your contribution is published. **For the purpose of transparency, the type of respondent (for example, 'business association, 'consumer association', 'EU citizen') country of origin, organisation name and size, and its transparency register number, are always published. Your e-mail address will never be published.** Opt in to select the privacy option that best suits you. Privacy options default based on the type of respondent selected

\* **Contribution publication privacy settings**

The Commission will publish the responses to this public consultation. You can choose whether you would like your details to be made public or to remain anonymous.



**Anonymous**

Only organisation details are published: The type of respondent that you responded to this consultation as, the name of the organisation on whose behalf you reply as well as its transparency number, its size, its country of origin and your contribution will be published as received. Your name will not be published. Please do not include any personal data in the contribution itself if you want to remain anonymous.

**Public**

Organisation details and respondent details are published: The type of respondent that you responded to this consultation as, the name of the organisation on whose behalf you reply as well as its transparency number, its size, its country of origin and your contribution will be published. Your name will also be published.

I agree with the [personal data protection provisions](#)

## Glossary

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A [glossary of acronyms used in this consultation](#) is available in the consultation document.

## 1. Key vulnerabilities and risks stemming from NBFi

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Based on the recent Commission’s report on the macroprudential review for banks and NBFi, this consultation paper identifies the following key vulnerabilities stemming from NBFi:

1. unmitigated liquidity mismatches<sup>[5]</sup>
2. the build-up of excessive leverage
3. interconnectedness among NBFi sectors and between NBFi and banks

Moreover, a lack of consistency and coordination among macroprudential frameworks across the EU can exacerbate the negative impact of such vulnerabilities, leading to unaddressed systemic risks (see Table 1 below).

**Table 1 – Key vulnerabilities and systemic risks stemming from NBFi**

Vulnerabilities	Systemic risks
Unmitigated liquidity mismatches	Liquidity risk

Excessive leverage	Liquidity risk, counterparty risk, concentration risk
Interconnectedness	Liquidity risk, counterparty risk, concentration risk, risk amplification, underestimation of risk, spillover risks

On **unmitigated liquidity mismatches**, events in March 2020, during the market stress caused by COVID-19, revealed, for instance, that some Money Market Funds (MMFs) experienced runs by investors to secure cash<sup>[6]</sup>. While no EU-based MMF had to introduce redemption fees or gates, or suspend redemptions, the European Central Bank (ECB) intervened with a purchase programme in the underlying short-term funding markets, in particular in Commercial Paper (CP) and Certificates of Deposits (CD) markets, which [also contributed to stop outflows in those MMFs](#). Similar vulnerabilities may also arise in other investment fund segments with less liquid underlying markets, such as open-ended fixed income and real estate funds<sup>[7]</sup>. With regard to MMFs, the [MMF Regulation \(MMFR\)](#) includes specific safeguards to ensure the stability, liquidity and safety of investments in MMFs. These include liquidity requirements, maturity limits, quality standards for investments, and bi-annual stress testing executed by managers, the results of which are communicated to supervisors. Maintaining adequate liquidity buffers is crucial to effectively monitor and manage liquidity risk. Changes in buffers usually reflect adjustments to risk and/or changes in the composition of the investor base, which require holding a smaller or bigger liquidity buffer.

On **leverage**<sup>[8]</sup>, the failure of Archegos Capital Management, an unregulated ‘family office’ operating on behalf of a wealthy investor is an example of the potential negative impact of excessive leverage on lenders and the financial system as a whole<sup>[9]</sup>. Archegos leveraged at least 5-6 times their invested capital to build excessively large and concentrated equity derivative exposures disregarding risk management best practices, like limiting asset concentration<sup>[10]</sup>. Moreover, an entity that takes a leveraged position, for instance through derivatives, may also be exposed to counterparty credit risk if the counterparty providing liquidity to fund margin calls is not sufficiently robust to keep providing liquidity in stressed conditions. Excessive leverage could also go undetected when using complex investment strategies involving several legal entities and fund of funds.

**Interconnectedness**, which is key to generate efficiencies in financial markets, can make systemic risk difficult to detect, as it can create unforeseen risk amplifiers and transfer of risk within NBFIs sectors and/or between the banking and NBFIs sectors (e.g. in funding markets). For instance, the sudden surge in energy prices in 2022 led to a sharp rise in margin calls for key energy contracts, which in turn led to a sale of assets to cover margin calls by both banks and NBFIs and to the downward move in prices of such assets intensifying a vicious circle in asset prices<sup>[11]</sup>. Unexpected margin calls, due to large price shocks or procyclical effects, does thus increase liquidity risk. During the surge in prices, some big energy derivatives trading companies were not sufficiently prepared for a spike in prices and the subsequent significant margin calls and had to request government support to avoid large losses on their hedges<sup>[12]</sup>. In recent years, crypto assets markets have also grown in size, as they are increasingly becoming target markets of institutional investors. Understanding the risks emerging from the growing interconnectedness between traditional and emerging digital financial assets is essential. The entry into force of the [Markets in Crypto Assets Regulation \(MiCAR\)](#) will ensure regulation and supervision of crypto assets and crypto asset service providers and will enable supervisors to have a better picture of these risks. Interconnectedness could also emerge from the failure of a NBFI, which can have knock-on effects on other NBFIs, the banking sector or the economy and may require mitigation measures.

On **coordination and consistency**, the macroprudential tools available to supervisors in NBFI are applied or activated by supervisors that often operate with varying mandates and enforcement powers even within the same jurisdiction. This can lead to an inconsistent application of macroprudential tools, an unlevel playing field within the EU and a heightened risk of supervisory and regulatory arbitrage, as well as an inability to detect systemic risk. In addition, due to the cross-border nature of the non-banking sector, the lack of cross-jurisdiction coordination in times of systemic crisis could magnify the negative impact of such vulnerabilities. For the investment fund sector, the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) is tasked with a coordination role over supervisory activities by NCAs. During the COVID-19 crisis, ESMA held bi-weekly meetings with NCAs, supported by an ad-hoc data collection on liquidity risks. Under

Article 25 AIFMD, after considering the advice of the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB), [ESMA issued advice to NCAs on the use of leverage limits by AIFMs](#), when leverage poses a substantial risk to the stability and integrity of the financial system<sup>[13]</sup>. ESMA has also published guidelines to promote effective and convergent practices on stress testing and to identify leverage-related systemic risk, which helps NCAs to define when the conditions to impose leverage limits are met<sup>[14]</sup>.

Against this background, NBFIs are also a source of funding opportunities for companies seeking access to finance from capital markets. In the context of the capital markets union, policy interventions to address vulnerabilities and risks of NBFIs should not unnecessarily constrain funding opportunities that NBFIs bring to the financial system.

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<sup>5</sup> A liquidity mismatch is a financial situation typical of entities that are engaged in liquidity transformation, whereby the liquidity of the invested assets does not correspond (either in full or in part) to the liquidity of the liabilities of that given entity. For instance, liquidity mismatch in investment funds implies that some of the assets cannot be liquidated within the same timeframe that is required by the fund to fulfil under its redemption policy scenario. An ‘unmitigated’ liquidity mismatch is a situation where such liquidity mismatch is not adequately mitigated by specific tools, such as liquidity management tools to withstand a plausible redemption scenario.

<sup>6</sup> In particular, some MMFs that offered stable redemption prices, but invested primarily in assets issued by private entities that are less liquid than cash, experienced acute stress. Among those, USD-denominated LVNAV saw the largest outflows during the period. [See Commission report on the functioning of the MMF Regulation](#). During this period, the European Central Bank (ECB) also intervened with a purchase programme in the underlying short-term funding markets, in particular in Commercial Paper (CP) and Certificates of Deposits (CD) markets, which also contributed to stop outflows from those MMFs.

<sup>7</sup> In the case of real estate funds, several funds across the EU had to introduce longer notice periods to deal with illiquidity and rising redemption rates.

<sup>8</sup> ‘Leverage’ means any method by which a legal or a natural person increases its exposure to an asset whether through borrowing of cash (financial leverage) or through borrowing securities or through leverage embedded in derivative positions (synthetic leverage).

<sup>9</sup> Archegos collapsed in Q1 2021 and spread large losses across financial institutions (and most of all on Credit Suisse with a \$5.5 billion loss) due to a too large exposure to a few stocks via total return swaps and contracts for difference. Please, see [Archegos info kit – Credit Suisse](#). [See ESMA on Archegos](#). In particular, in the US, where the family office was located, market participants had to disclose stakes (direct holdings) in companies if they own more than 5%, but synthetic exposures through Total Return Swaps (TRSs) were not included. In the EU, as ESMA clarified, Member States had the discretion to impose notification for capital holdings, which include TRSs.

<sup>10</sup> Although exact figures are unknown, Archegos held assets on the order of \$10 billion, with exposures of between \$50 billion and \$100 billion (even higher according to some reports). These exposures were largely concentrated in shares of Viacom CBS and Discovery (U.S. telecommunications groups) and in various Chinese technology companies (e.g. Baidu). [See Archegos and Greensill: collapse, reactions and common features](#).

<sup>11</sup> It should be noted that most financial entities mark their assets to the current market prices, and thus adverse price movements impact their solvency, and subsequently their perceived creditworthiness and their cost of funding.

<sup>12</sup> [Germany pledges €67bn to bolster struggling energy companies, Financial Times](#)

<sup>13</sup> According to Article 25(6) of AIFMD, the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) shall issue advice on whether the conditions for taking action appear to be met, whether the measures are appropriate and on the duration of the measures.

<sup>14</sup> [ESMA publishes final guidance to address leverage risk in the AIF sector; Guidelines on liquidity stress testing in UCITS and AIFs and ESMA updates the parameters and methodology for MMF stress testing](#).

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## Questions 1 to 7

When answering the following questions, please consider how the question applies to different NBFi sectors (entities and markets) and specify the NBFi sectors concerned when providing a response. Please also provide quantitative evidence, where possible.

**Question 1. Are there other sources of systemic risks or vulnerabilities stemming from NBFIs’ activities and their interconnectedness, including activity through capital markets, that have not been identified in this paper?**

*5000 character(s) maximum*

including spaces and line breaks, i.e. stricter than the MS Word characters counting method.

Our response to this consultation focuses on providing input from the perspective of publicly listed property companies. Through participation in this consultation, we aim to clarify the role of listed property companies in the financial markets, as they, including Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs), are often inaccurately confused with real estate funds. Furthermore, during the recent technical workshop organised by the European Commission in May, which focused on macroprudential policies for NBFIs, discussions included references to commercial real estate and the role of REITs. However, statements made by the ESRB regarding REITs in the commercial real estate sector have led to confusion and drawn misleading conclusions.

The listed property sector can be divided into two main categories: ordinary listed property companies and listed REITs. Operationally, there is very little difference between these two vehicles. REITs are property investment companies that benefit from special tax treatment in exchange for meeting certain conditions, such as restrictions on debt financing and an obligation to distribute the majority of their profits annually. Both standard listed property companies and REITs operate as regular listed companies with internal management structures. They are constituted with capital divided into tradeable shares (securities) and are managed by a CEO, CFO, board of directors, supervisory boards, and annual shareholders' meetings. They follow corporate governance and auditing requirements under national corporate and commercial rules, rather than investment fund rules such as AIFMD. Hence, their legal and operational structures resemble those of any industrial or commercial company that is publicly listed and traded.

This distinction should be emphasised, as confusion appears to exist, with REITs and real estate investment funds sometimes being used interchangeably, despite representing different realities.

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## **Question 2. What are the most significant risks for credit institutions stemming from their exposures to NBFIs that you are currently observing?**

### **Please provide concrete examples:**

*5000 character(s) maximum*

including spaces and line breaks, i.e. stricter than the MS Word characters counting method.

In our view, the exposure of credit institutions to NBFIs in the commercial real estate (CRE) finance market does not pose significant risks. Additionally, increasing the involvement of NBFIs in CRE financing would enhance financial stability and mitigate risk concentration within the EU banking sector.

**Question 3. To what extent could the failure of an NBFi affect the provision of critical functions to the real economy or the financial system that cannot easily be replaced?**

- 1 - To a very low extent
- 2 - To a low extent
- 3 - To a significant extent
- 4 - To a high extent
- 5 - To a very high extent
- Don't know / no opinion / not applicable

**Please explain your answer to question 3, in particular to which NBFi sector, part of the financial system and critical function you refer to, and if and how you believe such knock-on effect could be mitigated:**

*5000 character(s) maximum*

including spaces and line breaks, i.e. stricter than the MS Word characters counting method.

No specific comments for this question.

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**Question 4. Where in the NBFi sectors could systemic liquidity risk most likely materialise and how?**

**Which specific transmission channels of liquidity risk would be most relevant for NBFi?**

**Please provide concrete examples:**

*5000 character(s) maximum*

including spaces and line breaks, i.e. stricter than the MS Word characters counting method.

Our response to this consultation focuses on providing input from the perspective of publicly listed property companies. In discussing the transmission channels of liquidity risk, EPRA would like to highlight the important role that REITs can play in alleviating liquidity stress within the real estate market by providing the capital necessary to absorb a substantial volume of assets.

A notable example of this occurred in Spain and Ireland following the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), where government-backed "bad banks"—Sareb in Spain and NAMA in Ireland—were established to bail out commercial banks and developers overexposed to real estate. These two countries, among the hardest hit by the GFC, saw their bad banks left holding large portfolios of distressed real estate assets that needed to be reintroduced into the market.

In both cases, REITs provided a crucial channel for managing liquidity risk. With the capital and operational capacity to absorb these distressed assets, REITs helped stabilise the real estate market. They acquired and managed these assets, gradually returning them to the market under more stable conditions, thus preventing further market collapse and providing liquidity at a time when other market participants were constrained.

Further analysis of the role of REITs in the European economy, including additional case studies, is available in a study conducted by the Amsterdam School of Real Estate and can be accessed here:

[https://prodapp.epra.com/media/EPRA\\_Report\\_-\\_Impact\\_of\\_European\\_REITs\\_Long\\_1702641125409.pdf](https://prodapp.epra.com/media/EPRA_Report_-_Impact_of_European_REITs_Long_1702641125409.pdf)

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## **Question 5. Where in the NBFIs sectors do you see build-up of excessive leverage, and why?**

### **Which NBFIs could be most vulnerable?**

### **Please provide concrete examples:**

*5000 character(s) maximum*

including spaces and line breaks, i.e. stricter than the MS Word characters counting method.

Our response to this consultation focuses on providing insights from the perspective of publicly listed property companies. Transparency and the availability of information are fundamental standards for publicly listed companies, ensuring that financial data is readily accessible.

One of the key data points we regularly update is the Loan-to-Value (LTV) ratio, which has shown a consistent decrease since the GFC. Additional data, attached to this consultation, includes metrics such as debt-to-equity, interest coverage, and debt-to-EBITDA. An analysis of this dataset clearly demonstrates how the listed property sector has significantly reduced its leverage and improved its debt profile over the past 15 years.

Attached, you will find an overview of the updated data for this consultation (Annex 1). EPRA remains at your disposal should you require any further detailed data.

For additional information, particularly regarding REITs, we have also included a comparative table outlining key features of European REIT regimes, with specific reference to the leverage conditions applicable in each country where a REIT regime is established (Annex 2).

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**Question 6. Do you observe any systemic risks and vulnerabilities emerging from crypto assets trading and intermediaries in the EU?**

*5000 character(s) maximum*

including spaces and line breaks, i.e. stricter than the MS Word characters counting method.

No specific comments for this question.

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**Question 7. Considering the role NBFIs have in providing greater access to finance for companies and in the context of the capital markets union project, how can macroprudential policies support NBFIs' ability to provide such funding opportunities to companies, in particular through capital markets?**

**Please provide concrete examples:**

*5000 character(s) maximum*

including spaces and line breaks, i.e. stricter than the MS Word characters counting method.

In the context of the Capital Markets Union project, and with the goal of reducing concentration risks in the banking system, securitisation in the EU must be brought to the forefront of the discussion, with further improvements urgently needed. Despite regulatory efforts to revive the securitisation market, progress has been limited.

Even after the significant impact of the GFC, banks in the EU have remained the predominant providers of debt for commercial real estate. The introduction of the Capital Markets Union was intended to diversify funding sources; however, the EU has struggled to fully capitalise on securitisation and private capital markets. This missed opportunity has limited market resilience, kept risk concentrated within the banking sector, and hindered the alignment of non-bank capital with the growing demand for productive financing in the real estate industry.

In this context, REITs and other listed property companies that take loans from banks to finance large property acquisitions or development projects could benefit from a revitalised securitisation market. These loans are typically secured by high-quality, income-generating real estate assets. This provides institutional investors with low-risk, diversified exposure to the real estate sector, while banks improve their balance sheet liquidity and expand their lending capacity.

## 2. Overview of existing macroprudential tools and supervisory architecture in EU legislation

A more integrated EU macroprudential framework governing NBFIs, and tackling emerging risks across NBFIs sectors, is key to mitigate the build-up or manage the impact of systemic risk. In the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, the EU enhanced its **microprudential framework** and introduced for the first time **macroprudential oversight** for banks and key NBFIs sectors, such as the investment funds and insurance sectors. For banks, moreover, it also introduced a common macroprudential framework, with tools exclusively designed to mitigate systemic risks, together with a comprehensive crisis management framework to provide more powers and tools to deal with systemic crises ([Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive \(BRRD\)](#)).

On supervision of NBFIs, the [European System of Financial Supervision \(ESFS\)](#), which includes, among others, the ESRB and the European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs) – The [European Securities and Markets Authority \(ESMA\)](#), the [European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority \(EIOPA\)](#) and the [European Banking Authority \(EBA\)](#) –, is designed to ensure the stability and proper functioning of the EU financial system. The ESRB – established with [Regulation \(EU\)1092/2010](#) – is the body responsible for macroprudential oversight at the EU level and thus contributes to the prevention and monitoring of systemic risks in the EU (Article 3(1), [ESRB Regulation](#)). ESMA – established with [Regulation \(EU\)1095/2010](#) – and EIOPA – established with [Regulation \(EU\)1094/2010](#) – are, each in specific NBFIs sectors, responsible for monitoring, assessing and measuring systemic risk (Article 8 of the [ESMA Regulation](#) and Article 8 of the [EIOPA Regulation](#)). In recent years, EBA – established with [Regulation \(EU\)1093/2010](#) – has also gained a greater role in NBFIs with oversight responsibilities of significant asset-referenced and e-money token issuers under the MiCAR. The ESAs are also tasked to promote strong, effective and consistent regulation and supervision, as well as a more harmonised and consistent application of EU rules. The ESRB and the ESAs work collaboratively to monitor and assess risks, coordinating with NCAs across EU Member States, also developing own tools, such as stress tests.

On regulation, EU legislation already includes **a number of macroprudential tools** that have been introduced in sectoral legislation over the years (see following sections for more details). Macroprudential tools are requirements or procedures designed to directly mitigate vulnerabilities and to protect the financial system as a whole from large systemic events<sup>[15]</sup>, while **microprudential tools** may only indirectly mitigate systemic risk by addressing entity or transaction-level risks<sup>[16]</sup>. Macroprudential tools typically take the form of:

- pre-emptive measures (i.e. ex ante measures activated before systemic risk materialises, such as leverage limits)<sup>[17]</sup>
- ex-post measures (i.e. measures activated once systemic risk materialises, such as suspension of investors' rights to redeem units of investment funds)<sup>[18]</sup>

As the NBFIs include very diverse business models and markets, macroprudential tools are tailored for the different NBFIs sectors to successfully address systemic risks. For instance, while capital buffers tools are generally applicable to insurance companies (a principal-based business), these tools may not fit the business model of investment funds or family offices (agent-based businesses). Moreover, macroprudential tools can be a combination of activity-based and entity-based measures. Activity-based measures are applicable, based on financial stability concerns, to the type of activity provided regardless of the NBFIs entity providing it. Entity-based measures include leverage limits applicable to a specific entity or group of entities.

**Table 2. Examples of macroprudential tools for NBFIs in EU legislation and key characteristics**

	Activity-based	Entity-based



Pre-emptive tools	Leverage limit for loan-originating funds (introduced in the AIFMD /UCITS review)	Structural liquidity buffers (pre-emptive measure; Art. 24-25 MMFR)
Ex-post tools	Power to prohibit/restrict short selling transactions in case of serious threats to financial stability (ex post measure; Art. 28 <a href="#">Short Selling Regulation</a> )	Suspension of redemption rights (Art. 45 AIFMD and Art. 84 <a href="#">UCITS Directive</a> )

Macroprudential tools should be typically accompanied by effective and well-coordinated oversight, coordination (at least at EU level), as well as adequate reporting and disclosure rules to ensure visibility over market participants' actions and to ensure that the tools are properly implemented. Given the cross-border nature of NBFIs, oversight should be done not only at national, but also at an EU level to ensure that all relevant NCAs have the necessary information to mitigate systemic risks in the EU. It should be assessed whether more needs to be done to strengthen the macroprudential oversight and coordination mechanisms of the EFSF in the EU.

<sup>15</sup> As stated in the [De Larosière Report](#), “the objective of macro-prudential supervision is to limit the distress of the financial system as a whole in order to protect the overall economy from significant losses in real output.”

<sup>16</sup> For instance, leverage limits are prudential measures that have a microprudential nature when they are designed and implemented to face an idiosyncratic entity or transaction-level risk, but they are macroprudential tools when they are designed and implemented at sector-wide level, disregarding the individual business model or activity. This is the case of structural limits for Alternative Investment Funds, under the recently agreed AIFMD/UCITS review, which qualify as macroprudential tools.

<sup>17</sup> This subset, among other, includes: 1) capital, margin, or liquidity buffers to prevent the build-up of vulnerabilities, and thus mitigate the materialisation of risks stemming from or leading to a systemic shock; 2) Limits to the build-up of leverage for banks and non-banks that are designed exclusively to increase the loss absorption of financial institutions against a systemic event or restrict certain activities/behaviours.

<sup>18</sup> This subset, among other, includes: 1) tools designed to avoid procyclicality of margin haircuts or to better manage the liquidity of investment funds against redemption risk (so called, liquidity management tools, LMTs); and 2) powers to halt trading in specific instruments or activities in times of extreme volatility or in case of a systemic event to protect the public interest, e.g. via the suspension of redemptions of units of investment funds.

## 2.1 Asset management and open-ended funds (OEFs)

The EU's investment fund sector operates under a comprehensive regulatory framework, primarily governed by the AIFMD and the UCITS. In addition, MMFs are subject to additional rules provided for by the MMFR. These pieces of legislation include a wide array of regulatory requirements addressing the use of leverage, liquidity risk management, transparency and portfolio concentration and diversification.

For instance, the AIFMD (Article 25) empowers NCAs under certain circumstances to introduce limits on the leverage used by AIFs. On this legal basis, in 2022, the CBI introduced a [leverage limit for Irish property funds](#). Furthermore, on the same basis, the CBI and CSSF both plan to introduce in Ireland and Luxembourg respectively yield buffers for [LDI<sup>\[19\]</sup> Funds](#).

To ensure sound liquidity risk management, the EU rules require AIF and UCITS managers to conduct stress testing, which is further specified in [ESMA guidelines on liquidity stress testing in UCITS and AIFs](#). According to the MMFR, MMF managers should conduct such stress tests twice a year<sup>[14]</sup>. In calibrating risk parameters and adverse scenarios, ESMA worked closely with the ESRB and the ECB (As part of ESMA's responsibility in the possibility to run EU-wide

stress tests, Art. 21(2), ESMA Regulation). If stress tests reveal vulnerabilities, the MMF manager must report and come up with a 'proposed action plan' to be communicated to the NCA thereof.

UCITSD and MMFR rules requiring diversification and imposing limits on investment concentration also address some of the risks stemming from interconnectedness with other financial and non-financial entities and sectors. AIFMs report to the supervisors on the principal exposures, concentrations and main counterparties, including on their risk profile, to monitor risk build-up in the financial system.

The 2024 review of the AIFMD/UCITSD amends the two legal frameworks by harmonising the definitions and application of LMTs designed to enhance UCITS and open-ended AIFs' ability to manage liquidity risks effectively. Moreover, the review sets a new structural leverage limit for loan-originating funds and requires risk diversification where loans are originated to other providers of financial services, thus further strengthening the sector's risk management capabilities. It also allows for the broadening of the scope of reporting for supervisory purposes potentially covering portfolio data, while improving reporting efficiency and minimising administrative burdens, where possible.

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<sup>19</sup> Liability Driven Investment (LDI) Funds, Central Bank of Ireland and CSSF communication on GBP Liability Driven Investment Funds consultation.

<sup>20</sup> According to Article 28 of MMFR, those stress tests shall cover hypothetical changes in asset liquidity, credit risk, interest rates, exchange rates, redemption levels, spreads among relevant indices, and macro systemic shocks affecting the broader economy. To support the process, ESMA produced MMF-specific guidelines on the parameters and methodology for simulating impacts of asset sales under stress market conditions. [See ESMA updates the parameters and methodology for MMF stress testing.](#)

## 2.2 Insurance

The insurance sector is regulated by a comprehensive EU prudential framework similar to the framework applicable to banks but with some notable differences due to key structural differences in their funding structures and business models. Compared to the banking sector, the risk stemming from financial leverage is rather minor in the insurance sector<sup>[21]</sup>. The main liability of insurance firms consists of technical provisions, which are considered stable funding and are less prone to a sudden withdrawal than bank debt (as in the case of bank runs). Insurance companies are instead more exposed to the risk stemming from synthetic leverage, via derivative exposures, to manage their long-term liabilities.

These exposures are managed under the Prudent Person Principle of [Solvency II](#) (Art. 132), insofar as they contribute to a reduction of risks or facilitate efficient portfolio management<sup>[22]</sup>. Furthermore, Solvency II requires regular reports to supervisory authorities of derivative positions, which are part of the broader information disclosure taking place under the Solvency and Financial Condition Report (Art. 51 of Solvency II Regulation). Liquidity risks for insurance companies are identified, monitored and addressed under the Own Risk and Solvency Assessment (ORSA).

The recently agreed Solvency II review introduces for the first time a macroprudential toolkit for the insurance sector in the EU, which includes a couple of amendments as regards liquidity risks. In particular, supervisory authorities will have the possibility, in exceptional situations and as a last resort measure, to impose on individual companies, or the entire market, temporary freezes on redemption options on life insurance policies. Supervisors will also be granted with the powers to restrict capital distributions in exceptional circumstances, such as dividend payments, to preserve insurers' liquidity and capital positions in stressed conditions. Moreover, insurers will have to develop liquidity risk management plans (LRMP) to explain how they intend to maintain adequate liquidity to settle their financial obligations even under stressed conditions. Lastly, a framework for the recovery and resolution of insurance and reinsurance undertakings was recently agreed by co-legislators, which would ensure more coordination and better tools to manage systemic crises in this sector<sup>[23]</sup>.

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<sup>21</sup> According to EIOPA, since 2007, debt funding does not represent more than 8% of an insurer's capital base. Please, see [EIOPA's second set of Advice to the European Commission on specific items in the Solvency II Delegated Regulation](#)

<sup>22</sup> Article 6(1)(g) and (h) and Article 10(e) and (f) of [Commission Implementing Regulation \(EU\) 2015/2450 of 2 December 2015 laying down implementing technical standards with regard to the templates for the submission of information to the supervisory authorities according to Directive 2009/138/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council](#)

<sup>23</sup> See the compromise text on the recovery and resolution of insurance and reinsurance undertakings Directive resulting from political agreement in interinstitutional negotiations in January 2024

## 2.3 Other NBFIs and markets

Regarding pension funds, Member States should ensure that NCAs duly consider the potential impact of pension funds' operations on the stability of the financial system in the EU, in particular in emergency situations (Art. 47 of [IORP Directive](#)). For large investment firms, capital coefficients for cash and derivative trading flows can be adjusted by NCAs if they 'seem overly restrictive and detrimental to financial stability' (Art. 15(5) of [Investment Firms Regulation](#)).

On markets, there are several measures that have been introduced over recent years. Among those, there are post global financial crisis measures, such as the central clearing obligation for over-the-counter derivatives (Art. 4 of [EMIR Regulation](#)), and requirements to limit procyclical effects in collateral haircut calculations for margins<sup>[24]</sup>. ESMA, EBA and NCAs have the power to prohibit or restrict marketing of a financial instrument or a financial activity to protect financial stability (Art. 40-42 of [MiFIR Regulation](#)). Finally, rules for the securitisation market have introduced macroprudential oversight by the ESRB (Art. 31 of [Securitisation Regulation](#)). For a preliminary list of macroprudential tools for NBFIs, please [see the annex](#).

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<sup>24</sup> [Commission Delegated Regulation \(EU\) No 153/2013 of 19 December 2012 supplementing Regulation \(EU\) No 648/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council with regard to regulatory technical standards on requirements for central counterparties](#).

## 3. Unmitigated liquidity mismatches

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This section aims at gathering data and information on potential unmitigated liquidity mismatches and tools to mitigate systemic risks in MMFs, OEFs and other NBFIs sectors.

### 3.1 Money Market Funds (MMFs)

In the past two years, the Commission has conducted a comprehensive assessment of the regulatory framework for MMFs, considering both prudential and economic perspectives.

Drawing upon economic analysis and industry feedback from the [2022 Commission targeted consultation](#), the [July 2023 Commission report on the functioning of the MMF Regulation](#) concluded that the MMFR safeguards (e.g. liquidity, repo recourse, diversification) are effective and successfully passed the test of liquidity stress experienced by MMFs in March 2020. Additionally, the MMFR imposes detailed reporting and periodic stress testing requirements (to be performed by MMF managers), allowing NCAs to identify potential unmitigated liquidity mismatches. The report also highlights that a large majority of EU MMFs have maintained their levels of liquidity buffers well above the current regulatory minimum. However, the report also identified some vulnerabilities that warrant further attention.

In particular, three potential areas for improvements were identified:

1. evaluating the need to increase the liquidity buffers
2. decoupling the activation of LMTs from the liquidity buffers for stable Net Asset Value (NAV) MMFs
3. enhancing supervision, the stress testing framework, and reporting requirements

While industry feedback and data have already been collected on the first two areas for improvement, further consultation is needed on the third area. Moreover, we seek views on the current definition of a "money market instrument".

On supervisory powers, we seek feedback on the feasibility to empower NCAs to increase MMF liquidity buffers on an individual or collective basis to mitigate systemic risk and ensure market stability. In this context, ESMA could have a coordination role focusing on systemic risk assessment and ensuring a consistent approach across jurisdictions, especially in a market crisis or when disputes between NCAs arise. This could mirror NCAs' intervention powers on leverage pursuant to Article 25 of AIFMD, which tasks ESMA and the NCAs with assessing whether the leverage employed by an AIFM, or by a group of AIFMs, poses a substantial risk to the stability and integrity of the financial system. Based on these assessments, NCAs have the authority to impose leverage limits on AIFMs to ensure financial stability and to prevent disorderly markets. For more details, see section 6.

On reporting, we are seeking views on potential ways to streamline and improve MMFR reporting to more effectively identify stability risks, while minimising the burden for reporting entities.

On the stress testing framework, we are consulting on potential additional steps to the current common stress testing framework for MMFs, which could include:

- additional elements on the knowledge of the investor base, particularly on investor concentration
- strengthened supervision and remediation action in case liquidity risks are detected. For instance, ESMA, after consulting the ESRB, could assess the effectiveness of corrective measures for liquidity risks, with NCAs providing a report indicating how the risks have been addressed
- improved reporting for supervisory purposes (including stress testing), such as timely access to data on portfolio composition and disclosure of underlying data and simulation models to NCAs, while minimising the reporting burden
- a Union-wide stress test run, e.g. by ESMA in coordination with the ESRB, at fund and asset management group levels

On the reverse distribution mechanism (this mechanism would involve the redemption and cancellation of a number of units of MMFs to offset the negative yield generated by the fund), the consultation paper wants to explore whether this mechanism should continue to be banned under EU rules or not.

Another area being explored is the instruments in which MMFs invest in, such as 'short-term assets' (Art. 2(1) of [MMF Regulation](#)) and 'money market instruments' (Art. 3 of [Directive 2007/16/EC](#) – in particular, this definition includes instruments that have a maturity up to 397 days and are not traded on a regulated venue). MMFs do not necessarily distinguish between instruments that are traded or not on a regulated venue. Instruments traded on a regulated venue, in particular, are subject to greater transparency and organisational requirements for secondary trading and may be potentially more resilient and liquid in case of a systemic event. Moreover, the potential availability of a venue where to match interests to liquidate short-term assets may facilitate liquidity management of MMFs during crises, even if in normal times secondary trading activity remains low.

## Questions 8 to 15

### Supervisory powers

**Question 8. What are pros and cons of giving the competent authority the power to increase liquidity buffer requirements on an individual or collective basis in the event of system-wide financial stability risks? Under which other situation do you believe MMF liquidity buffers should be increased on an individual or collective basis by the competent authority?**

#### Question 8.1 Please explain what are the pros?

*5000 character(s) maximum*

including spaces and line breaks, i.e. stricter than the MS Word characters counting method.

No specific comments for this question.

**Question 8.2 Please explain what are the cons?**

*5000 character(s) maximum*

including spaces and line breaks, i.e. stricter than the MS Word characters counting method.

No specific comments for this question.

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**Question 9. How can ESMA and ESRB ensure coordination and the proper use of this power and what could be their individual roles?**

**Please provide specific examples or scenarios to support your view:**

*5000 character(s) maximum*

including spaces and line breaks, i.e. stricter than the MS Word characters counting method.

No specific comments for this question.

**Reporting requirements**

**Question 10. In view of the new UCITS supervisory reporting obligations and improvements to AIFMD reporting, how could reporting requirements under the MMFR be aligned, simplified and improved to identify stability risks (such as liquidity risks) and to ensure more efficient data sharing?**

*5000 character(s) maximum*

including spaces and line breaks, i.e. stricter than the MS Word characters counting method.

No specific comments for this question.

### **Stress testing framework**

**Question 11. Do you believe that the proposed enhancements to the stress testing framework listed above are sufficient to identify and mitigate liquidity risks effectively?**

**If not, what specific elements would you suggest including in the strengthened supervision and remediation actions for detecting liquidity risks?**

*5000 character(s) maximum*

including spaces and line breaks, i.e. stricter than the MS Word characters counting method.

No specific comments for this question.

**Question 12. What are the costs and benefits of introducing an EU-wide stress test on MMFs?**

**Should this stress test focus mainly on liquidity risks?**

*5000 character(s) maximum*

including spaces and line breaks, i.e. stricter than the MS Word characters counting method.

No specific comments for this question.

**Reverse distribution mechanism**

**Question 13. What are your views on the EU ban on a reverse distribution mechanism by MMFs?**

*5000 character(s) maximum*

including spaces and line breaks, i.e. stricter than the MS Word characters counting method.

No specific comments for this question.

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**Question 14. Can you provide insights and data on how the reverse distribution mechanism has impacted in practice the stability and integrity of MMFs?**

*5000 character(s) maximum*

including spaces and line breaks, i.e. stricter than the MS Word characters counting method.

No specific comments for this question.



## Liquidity and short-term instruments

**Question 15. Should regulatory requirements for MMFs take into account whether the instrument they are investing in is admitted to trading on a trading venue (regulated markets, multilateral trading facilities or organised trading facilities) with some critical level of trading activity?**

**Please explain your answer:**

*5000 character(s) maximum*

including spaces and line breaks, i.e. stricter than the MS Word characters counting method.

No specific comments for this question.

## 3.2 Other open-ended funds (OEFs)

Liquidity risk in investment funds refers to the possibility that a fund may not be able to meet its financial obligations, such as payments or redemption requests, in accordance with the fund's rules. This risk is more enhanced in OEFs<sup>[25]</sup>, especially when the OEF's structural liquidity mismatch (i.e. difference between the liquidity of the fund's assets and its liabilities) is not managed using relevant tools (e.g. LMTs and liability management) in light of potential liquidity shocks. Liquidity risks are particularly important for OEFs that are either invested in illiquid assets or offer frequent redemption without adequate LMTs (to deal with a plausible redemption shock), such as sufficient notice period, gate mechanisms and/or liquidity buffers. Liquidity risk can also impact closed-ended funds, particularly in scenarios involving leverage, where significant market fluctuations may require sudden margin calls or deleveraging.

The recent AIFMD/UCITS review has introduced a harmonised set of LMTs and laid down mandates for ESMA to further guide a uniform use of LMTs by managers across the EU. Those rules, which are adopted at fund level, will have to be operationalised by regulatory technical standards (RTSs) and ESMA guidelines on the characteristics, selection and activation of those LMTs. The expectation is that new provisions will enhance the resilience of all investment funds, including MMFs, when they become applicable in 2026. Furthermore, the AIFMD/UCITS review includes a new reporting system for AIFs and UCITS, which will include an ESMA RTS on a new reporting template for AIFMs and a novel obligation for UCITS to report on their holdings.



Taking into account these developments, more could be done to improve the ability of macroprudential authorities to identify liquidity stresses in a timely manner or to monitor liquidity risk at systemic level (e.g. through EU-wide stress tests) and about the role of NCAs in the selection of LMTs.

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<sup>25</sup> 'Open-ended funds' (OEFs) in the EU can either take the legal form of UCITS funds (Art. 76, UCITSD) or of alternative investment funds (AIFs) whose shares or units can be redeemed at the request of any shareholder or unitholder, directly or indirectly from the AIF's assets, before the liquidation or wind-down phase begins and according to the AIF fund rule. (Article 1(2) of Regulation (EU) No 694/2014). This definition encompasses different realities, from highly liquid AIFs to AIFs offering infrequent liquidity, often referred to as semi-liquid AIFs.

### 3.2.1 Enhancing the supervisory framework on liquidity risks

As mentioned, investment fund managers are required to periodically conduct stress-testing. Nevertheless, NCAs' monitoring of liquidity risks and their evolution on a broad scale is currently hampered by the lack of accurate metrics. Specifically, metrics for liquidity risks require an accurate assessment of unmitigated liquidity mismatches, i.e. where a liquidity mismatch is not adequately mitigated by specific tools, such as liquidity management tools, to withstand a plausible redemption scenario. Additionally, these metrics depend on the precise calibration of worst-case and stress-case scenarios related to redemptions and margin calls, as well as evaluating the effectiveness of LMTs in mitigating risks.

Liquidity stress test data at fund level can help NCAs to verify whether the LMTs of a fund (or a cohort of funds) or the use of an OEF architecture are or remain appropriate. While ensuring that the activation of the LMT remains full responsibility of the manager, who is the one best placed to trigger it, NCAs should use the collected data and reporting to identify inconsistencies between the liquidity profile (assets/liabilities) of an investment fund and the use of specific LMTs and ask for remedial actions where needed. In addition, to ensure a level playing field and more effective coordination and implementation of macroprudential policies, the NCA or ESMA could have the power to require the asset management company, for financial stability reasons (independent from the appropriateness assessment abovementioned) and where certain conditions are met, to select a specific LMT for a fund or a cohort of funds, even if not previously selected by the manager.

## Questions 16 to 25

### Link between liquidity mismatch and liquidity risks

**Question 16. How can NCAs better monitor the liquidity profile of OEFs, including redemption frequency and LMTs, in order to detect unmitigated liquidity mismatches during the lifetime of OEFs?**

*5000 character(s) maximum*

including spaces and line breaks, i.e. stricter than the MS Word characters counting method.

No specific comments for this question.

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**Question 17. Only for NCAs and EU bodies: What is the supervisory practice and your experience with monitoring and detecting unmitigated liquidity mismatches during the lifetime of OEFs?**

**What is the data that you find most relevant when monitoring liquidity risks of OEFs?**

*5000 character(s) maximum*

including spaces and line breaks, i.e. stricter than the MS Word characters counting method.

No specific comments for this question.

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**Question 18. Only for NCAs and EU bodies: What supervisory actions do you take when unmitigated liquidity mismatches are detected during the lifetime of an OEF?**

*5000 character(s) maximum*

including spaces and line breaks, i.e. stricter than the MS Word characters counting method.

No specific comments for this question.

**Question 19. On the basis of the reporting and stress testing information being collected by competent authorities throughout the life of a fund, how can supervisory powers of competent authorities be enhanced to deal with potential inconsistencies or insufficient calibration between the LMTs selected by the manager for a fund or a cohort of funds and their assets and liabilities liquidity profile?**

**How can NCAs ensure that fund managers make adjustments to LMTs if they are unwilling to act? How could coordination be enhanced at the EU level?**

*5000 character(s) maximum*

including spaces and line breaks, i.e. stricter than the MS Word characters counting method.

No specific comments for this question.

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**Question 20. Only for asset managers: What measures do you find particularly effective to measure and monitor liquidity risk in stressed market conditions?**

*5000 character(s) maximum*

including spaces and line breaks, i.e. stricter than the MS Word characters counting method.

No specific comments for this question.

**Question 21. Only for asset managers: What difficulties have you encountered in measuring and monitoring liquidity risks and their evolution?**

**Are there enough tools available under the EU regulations to address liquidity mismatches?**

*5000 character(s) maximum*

including spaces and line breaks, i.e. stricter than the MS Word characters counting method.

No specific comments for this question.

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**Question 22. Only for asset managers: What are the challenges in calibrating worst-case and stress-case scenarios related to redemptions and margin calls?**

*5000 character(s) maximum*

including spaces and line breaks, i.e. stricter than the MS Word characters counting method.

No specific comments for this question.

**Stress testing**

**Question 23. Only for NCAs and EU bodies:** When monitoring or using results of liquidity stress tests, are you able to timely collect underlying fund data used by managers and the methodology used for the simulation?

**Are there other aspects that you find very relevant when monitoring the stress tests run by managers?**

*5000 character(s) maximum*

including spaces and line breaks, i.e. stricter than the MS Word characters counting method.

No specific comments for this question.

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**Question 24. Only for NCAs and EU bodies:** How do you use information collected from stress tests at fund level for other supervisory purposes and for monitoring systemic risks?

*5000 character(s) maximum*

including spaces and line breaks, i.e. stricter than the MS Word characters counting method.

No specific comments for this question.

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**Question 25. Only for NCAs and EU bodies:** What are the main benefits and costs of introducing a stress test requirement at the asset management company level and how could this be organised?

*5000 character(s) maximum*

including spaces and line breaks, i.e. stricter than the MS Word characters counting method.

No specific comments for this question.

### 3.3 Other NBFIs and markets

Other NBFIs, such as large commodity traders, and the functioning of large short-term funding markets, are increasingly playing an important role during stress scenarios. March 2020 events also raised flags about the resilience of some money markets, such as commercial paper (CP) and certificate of deposits (CD) markets. Improving their functioning could strengthen their resilience in crisis times.

Commodity derivatives are traded under various strategies by different types of counterparties, including financial and non-financial undertakings which hedge their commercial business (e.g. energy companies) or which contribute to the liquidity of the energy derivative markets. In case of large and unexpected price shocks, liquidity stress can be heightened by corresponding large and unexpected margin calls that traders, such as commodity trading companies, need to be prepared to address.

Another key feature of commodity derivatives is the dual presence of market participants who are active in both the spot /physical market and the futures markets. The respective regulatory and supervisory frameworks differ or are not aligned. The activities of energy traders that are active only or mainly on energy spot markets can also have repercussions on financial markets (energy derivatives). This is notably the case in situations of stressed energy supply or when energy spot market purchases serve as the principal tool for filling storage capacity. In such instances, volatility in spot markets can rapidly spill over into energy derivatives.

Finally, unexpected margin calls can also affect market participants in other derivatives markets. The UK Gilt crisis in September 2022 raised questions about the ability of pension funds to deal with large margin calls, especially when exposed to sizeable derivative exposures (directly or through LDI funds).

### Questions 26 to 42

#### Other NBFIs

**Question 26. What are your views on the preparedness of NBFIs operating in the EU in meeting margin calls, and on the ways to improve preparedness, taking into account existing or recently agreed EU measures aimed at addressing this issue?**

**Please specify the NBFIs sector(s) you refer to in your answer:**

*5000 character(s) maximum*

including spaces and line breaks, i.e. stricter than the MS Word characters counting method.

No specific comments for this question.

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**Question 27. What are relevant risk metrics or tools that can be used to effectively monitor liquidity and margin preparedness across all NBF entity types?**

**Please provide examples specifying the sector you refer to:**

*5000 character(s) maximum*

including spaces and line breaks, i.e. stricter than the MS Word characters counting method.

No specific comments for this question.

### **Pension Funds**

**Question 28. How can current reporting by pension funds be improved to improve the supervision of liquidity risks (e.g. stemming from exposure to LDI funds, other funds or derivatives), while minimising the reporting burden? What can be done to ensure effective look-through capability and the ability to measure the impact of unexpected margin calls?**

**Please provide examples also for other NBF sectors.**

*5000 character(s) maximum*

including spaces and line breaks, i.e. stricter than the MS Word characters counting method.

No specific comments for this question.

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**Question 29. What would be the benefits and costs of a regular EU-wide liquidity stress test for pension funds and with what frequency?**

**What should be the role of EU authorities in the preparation and execution of such liquidity stress tests?**

*5000 character(s) maximum*

including spaces and line breaks, i.e. stricter than the MS Word characters counting method.

No specific comments for this question.

### Short-term funding markets

**Question 30. What would be the benefits and costs of creating a framework or a label in EU legislation for certain money market instruments (such as commercial papers) to increase transparency and standardisation?**

**Should the scope of eligible instruments to such framework/label be aligned with Article 3 of [Directive 2007/16/EC](#)?**

**If not, please suggest what criteria would you consider for identification of eligible instruments:**

*5000 character(s) maximum*

including spaces and line breaks, i.e. stricter than the MS Word characters counting method.

No specific comments for this question.



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**Question 31. Would the presence of a wider range of issuers (notably smaller issuers) to fund themselves on this market, and therefore diversify their funding sources, be beneficial or detrimental to financial stability?**

*5000 character(s) maximum*

including spaces and line breaks, i.e. stricter than the MS Word characters counting method.

No specific comments for this question.

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**Question 32. What are your views on why euro-denominated commercial papers are in large part issued in the ‘EUR-CP’ commercial paper market outside the EU?.**

**What risks do you identify?.**

**Please provide quantitative and qualitative evidence, if possible:**

*5000 character(s) maximum*

including spaces and line breaks, i.e. stricter than the MS Word characters counting method.

No specific comments for this question.

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**Question 33. What could be done to improve the liquidity of secondary markets in commercial papers and certificates of deposits?**

*5000 character(s) maximum*

including spaces and line breaks, i.e. stricter than the MS Word characters counting method.

No specific comments for this question.

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**Question 34. Considering market practice today, is the maturity threshold for ‘money market instruments’ (up to 397 days) in the Eligible Asset Directive 2007/16 sufficiently calibrated for these short-term funding markets?**

*5000 character(s) maximum*

including spaces and line breaks, i.e. stricter than the MS Word characters counting method.

No specific comments for this question.

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**Question 35. Do you think there is a risk with the high concentration of this market in a few investors (MMF and banks)?**

**Please elaborate:**

*5000 character(s) maximum*

including spaces and line breaks, i.e. stricter than the MS Word characters counting method.

No specific comments for this question.

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**Question 36. How could secondary markets in these money market instruments attract liquidity and a more diverse investor base, while relying less on banks buying back papers they have helped to place?**

*5000 character(s) maximum*

including spaces and line breaks, i.e. stricter than the MS Word characters counting method.

No specific comments for this question.

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**Question 37. What are the benefits and costs of introducing an obligation to trade on trading venues (regulated markets, multilateral trading facilities and organised trading facilities) for such instruments?**

*5000 character(s) maximum*

including spaces and line breaks, i.e. stricter than the MS Word characters counting method.

No specific comments for this question.

**Question 38. Can the possibility to trade on a regulated venue increase the chances of secondary market activities in a systemic event, for instance by acting as a safety valve for funds that need to trade these assets before maturity (especially when facing strong redemption pressures, like for MMFs)?**

*5000 character(s) maximum*

including spaces and line breaks, i.e. stricter than the MS Word characters counting method.

No specific comments for this question.

**Commodities markets**

**Question 39. How would you assess the level of preparedness of commodity derivatives market participants for each of the following sectors in terms of meeting short-term liquidity needs or requests for collateral to meet margins?**

	1 (very low level of preparedness)	2 (low level of preparedness)	3 (medium level of preparedness)	4 (high level of preparedness)	5 (very high level of preparedness)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
Insurance companies	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>
UCITS funds	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>
AIFs	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>
Commercial undertakings	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>
Investment firms	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>
Pension funds	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>

**Please explain your answers to question 39:**

*5000 character(s) maximum*

including spaces and line breaks, i.e. stricter than the MS Word characters counting method.

No specific comments for this question.

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**Question 40. In light of the potential risk of contagion from spot markets or off-exchange energy trading to futures markets, do you think that spot market participants should also meet a more comprehensive set of trading rules for market participation and risk management?**

**Please elaborate on your response:**

*5000 character(s) maximum*

including spaces and line breaks, i.e. stricter than the MS Word characters counting method.

No specific comments for this question.

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**Question 41. How can it be ensured that the functioning of underlying spot energy markets and off-exchange energy trading activity does not lead to the transmission of risks to financial markets?**

*5000 character(s) maximum*

including spaces and line breaks, i.e. stricter than the MS Word characters counting method.

No specific comments for this question.

## Other markets

**Question 42. To what extent do you see emerging liquidity risks or market functioning issues that can affect liquidity in other markets?**

- 1 - To a very low extent
- 2 - To a low extent
- 3 - To a significant extent
- 4 - To a high extent
- 5 - To a very high extent
- Don't know / no opinion / not applicable

**Please explain your answer to question 42, providing concrete examples:**

*5000 character(s) maximum*

including spaces and line breaks, i.e. stricter than the MS Word characters counting method.

No specific comments for this question.

## 4. Excessive leverage

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Excessive leverage is a significant vulnerability because it can act as a (hidden) risk amplifier (through position liquidation and counterparty channel) of several risks, such as liquidity, counterparty and concentration risks. While financial leverage is generally reported and visible by most NBFIs, detecting synthetic leverage via derivatives positions in some instances (such as through the use of other legal vehicles) can be very difficult. Nonetheless, derivatives are key for the provision of financial products by several NBFIs, such as insurance companies and pension funds, in particular those offering products driven by long-term guaranteed liabilities (e.g. some life insurance products or defined benefit pension plans).

There are some tools to deal with leverage, such as leverage limits (like the one used under Art. 25 AIFMD) or restrictions targeting the use of specific leveraged products.

### 4.1 Open-ended funds (OEFs)

Both UCITSD and AIFMD have requirements that restrict the use of leverage. The AIFMD (Art. 25) gives the possibility to NCAs to introduce leverage limits or other restrictions to leverage (such as yield buffers) for an individual fund or

groups of funds. To date, two authorities have made use of the Article 25 in AIFMD to impose leverage limits by means of a yield buffer to GDP-denominated LDI funds (see introduction). Furthermore, the recent AIFMD review has introduced a structural (absolute) limit on leverage for loan-originating funds that will be applicable from 2026. In addition, competent authorities have been granted powers to introduce leverage limits for specific alternative investment funds (AIFs) under AIFMD Article 25.

In order to identify pockets of synthetic leverage, AIFMD and EMIR have introduced reporting requirements at fund and transaction level respectively, which should allow for a comprehensive view of synthetic leverage. Investment funds and their management companies also interact with other NBFIs and banks, and they are large players in global funding markets. There should be better understanding on what is the ability to detect leverage when using complex investment strategies involving, for instance, synthetic leverage via investment in other funds.

## Questions 43 to 46

### **Question 43. What are other tools than those currently available under EU legislation which could be used to contain systemic risks generated by potential pockets of excessive leverage in OEFs?**

*5000 character(s) maximum*

including spaces and line breaks, i.e. stricter than the MS Word characters counting method.

No specific comments for this question.

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### **Question 44. What are, in your view, the benefits and costs of using yield buffers<sup>[\*]</sup> for Liability-Driven funds, such as it was done in Ireland and Luxembourg, to address leverage?**

\* The yield buffer is defined as the level of increase in yields that a fund can withstand before its net asset value (NAV) turns negative. See [The Central Bank's macroprudential policy framework for Irish-authorised GBP-denominated LDI funds](#), p.3.

*5000 character(s) maximum*

including spaces and line breaks, i.e. stricter than the MS Word characters counting method.

No specific comments for this question.



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**Question 45. While on average EU OEFs are not highly leveraged, are there, to your knowledge, pockets of excessive leverage in the OEF sector that are not sufficiently addressed?**

**Please elaborate with concrete examples:**

*5000 character(s) maximum*

including spaces and line breaks, i.e. stricter than the MS Word characters counting method.

No specific comments for this question.

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**Question 46. How can leverage through certain investment strategies (e.g. when funds invest in other funds based in third countries) be better detected?**

*5000 character(s) maximum*

including spaces and line breaks, i.e. stricter than the MS Word characters counting method.

No specific comments for this question.

## **4.2 Other NBFIs and markets**

Leverage of other NBFIs can also create issues if not properly monitored and eventually managed. Reporting mechanisms play a key role to identify pockets of leverage and reconcile with ultimate beneficiaries, as well as to understand the interconnections, also in terms of counterparty risk management. While there is already transaction-

level (e.g. EMIR and MiFIR) and entity-level reporting (e.g. Solvency II), the question is whether reporting can be improved in order to provide entities and supervisors involved with a timely picture of leverage to act upon, while minimising reporting burden. The role of highly concentrated intraday positions in derivatives markets, in a general context of low market liquidity (such as the 2022 energy crisis), in amplifying the effects of leverage (taken through the contractual terms of the derivative instrument) on market liquidity and volatility should be further explored.

## Questions 47 to 51

### Question 47. Are you aware of any NBFIs sector entities with particularly high leverage in the EU that could raise systemic risk concerns?

*5000 character(s) maximum*

including spaces and line breaks, i.e. stricter than the MS Word characters counting method.

EPRA would like to highlight a concrete example of a misleading and incomplete assessment in the latest report from the Financial Stability Board (FSB), issued on 23 October. Such reports from the FSB are used at the European level to draw conclusions.

However, this recent report cannot be fully relied upon for an accurate understanding of European real estate risk exposure. It combines data from varied financial environments, including U.S., European, and some Asian REITs, without accounting for crucial differences in accounting standards, regulatory frameworks, and valuation methods across these regions.

For instance, U.S. REITs report properties based on acquisition cost minus depreciation, leading to significant discrepancies from current market values and making their interest rate exposure appear far worse—a method not aligned with European standards. In contrast, European REITs are required to report their properties annually at market value, determined by an external appraiser. Additionally, the report groups together distinct entity types, such as private real estate funds, open-end real estate funds, equity REITs, and mortgage REITs (not present in Europe), each with differing levels of risk exposure. By failing to distinguish these entities, the report does not provide a focused analysis.

This oversight particularly affects European REITs, which are subject to unique valuation and regulatory practices aimed at mitigating these risks. By using a generalised dataset, the report overlooks critical regional differences, potentially distorting the assessment of real estate exposure and systemic vulnerabilities.

While the FSB's report may serve as a general overview, it does not adequately account for essential factors within the European context. Consequently, relying on its conclusions could result in a misinterpretation of the actual risk exposure levels in Europe's real estate sector.

In this regard, EPRA recommends thoughtful consideration of regulatory measures to address the data gap in commercial real estate across Europe. We believe that a collaborative and consultative approach can help establish a framework that meets stakeholders' needs while supporting stability and growth across Europe's economy. EPRA is prepared to work closely with the European Commission and Member States to shape and implement effective access to commercial real estate statistics.

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### Question 48. Do stakeholders have views on macroprudential tools to deal with leverage of NBFIs that are not currently included in EU legislation?

*5000 character(s) maximum*

including spaces and line breaks, i.e. stricter than the MS Word characters counting method.

Regarding listed property companies, we aim to emphasise the importance of distinguishing between the measurement of risk as a static metric and the inherently cyclical nature of commercial real estate. This cyclical characteristic must be taken into account when assessing risk. While leverage can indeed have systemic risk implications, it has not been demonstrated that leverage within our sector is inherently problematic. We refer to the points and data mentioned above (annex 1), which highlight the significant improvement in the debt profile of the listed property companies sector over the past 15 years.

To illustrate further, it is worth emphasising that REITs have a proven track record of resilience during challenging economic conditions. The absence of bankruptcies within the FTSE EPRA Nareit Developed Europe Index during the GFC underscores the stability of REITs, even under severe economic stress.

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**Question 49. Only for NCAs and EU bodies: Are you able to timely identify (financial and synthetic) leverage pockets of other NBFIs (such as pension funds, insurance companies and so on), especially when they are taken via third parties or complex derivative transactions?**

**Please elaborate on how this timely detection of leverage could be obtained:**

*5000 character(s) maximum*

including spaces and line breaks, i.e. stricter than the MS Word characters counting method.

No specific comments for this question.

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**Question 50. How can it be ensured that competent authorities can effectively reconcile positions in leveraged products (such as derivatives) taken via various legal entities (e.g. other funds or funds of funds) to the ultimate beneficiary?**

*5000 character(s) maximum*

including spaces and line breaks, i.e. stricter than the MS Word characters counting method.

No specific comments for this question.

## Commodities markets

**Question 51. What role do concentrated intraday positions have in triggering high volatility and heightening risks of liquidity dry-ups?**

**Please justify your response and suggest how the regulatory framework and the functioning of these markets could be further improved?**

*5000 character(s) maximum*

including spaces and line breaks, i.e. stricter than the MS Word characters counting method.

No specific comments for this question.

## 5. Monitoring interconnectedness

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While there are significant synergies in the interaction between various sectors of the financial system (with positive spillover effects on financial stability through more private risk sharing), more work is needed to identify and understand vulnerabilities stemming from (hidden) links between different NBFIs, and between banks and NBFIs, including in relation to risk of amplification and herding behaviours embedded in large portfolio overlaps<sup>[26]</sup>. This could be achieved through, for example, the conduct of an EU-wide stress tests across NBFi sectors and between NBFIs and banks. Other jurisdictions have also been cognisant of the risks that interconnection may bear to financial stability in certain cases and are trying to get a better understanding of related vulnerabilities with system-wide stress tests. For instance, the UK has recently launched the idea of a System-Wide Exploratory Scenario (SWES), which aims to improve understanding of how banks and NBFIs react to stressed financial market conditions and how those behaviours amplify shocks in financial markets and instability<sup>[27]</sup>.

In the EU, a system-wide EU stress test could simulate the impact of different scenarios on various NBFi sectors: funds, asset management companies, insurance, pension funds, large investment firms and key market infrastructures. The stress test could be done on a periodic basis (e.g. annually) and possibly use also stress test data on banks regularly run by EBA to simulate stress scenarios across all the sectors of the financial system. The stress test could include the impact of margin calls based on existing methodologies, in particular those of the EU CCP supervisory stress test conducted by ESMA. Moreover, the recent EMIR review introduced the Joint Monitoring Mechanism (JMM), which is, among other things, tasked with contributing to the development of Union-wide stress tests for the resilience of CCPs<sup>[28]</sup>. A broader EU-wide stress test could be based on a similar model, while exploring a greater role for horizontal bodies, such as the Joint Committee of the ESAs, as the stress test would cut across all NBFi sectors. The

ESRB could provide support on defining methodologies and stress scenarios, as it currently does for OEFs. The ESAs could be also in charge of data collection from NCAs. This exercise could follow some governance principles already laid out in existing system-wide exercises in the EU, such as the one-off Fit-for-55 climate risk scenario analysis<sup>[29]</sup>.

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<sup>26</sup> Large and systematic portfolio overlaps among banks and non-banks can lead to co-movement in prices and even fire sales of assets when entities react in the same way during a systemic event. Moreover, portfolio overlaps are not generally visible, unless data is cross-checked between sectors to estimate the influence that indirect exposures can have on systemic risk.

<sup>27</sup> There are just over 50 participants in the SWES – including banks, insurers, central counterparties, funds managed by asset managers, hedge funds, and pension funds. The Bank of England works closely with the Financial Conduct Authority, the Pensions Regulator, and other domestic and international regulators on the SWES. [See system-wide exploratory scenario, Bank of England.](#)

<sup>28</sup> The JMM comprises representatives from ESMA, EBA, EIOPA, ESRB, ECB, SSM and central banks of issue other than the Euro and is chaired by ESMA. Amongst its tasks are monitoring of compliance with the active account requirement; monitoring of the cross-border implications of client clearing relationships, including interdependencies and interactions with other financial market infrastructures; contributing to the development of Union-wide assessments of the resilience of CCPs focussing on liquidity, credit and operational risks concerning CCPs, clearing members and clients; identification of concentration risks, in particular in client clearing. In order to perform its tasks, the JMM can request information from NCAs and financial market participants, where the NCA so agrees.

<sup>29</sup> The one-off fit-for-55 climate risk scenario analysis aims to assess the resilience of the financial sector in line with the Fit-for-55 package, and to gain insights into the capacity of the financial system to support the transition to a lower carbon economy under conditions of stress. The one-off exercise is part of the new mandates received by the EBA in the scope of the European Commission's Renewed Sustainable Finance Strategy. Given its cross-sectoral and system-wide, this exercise is conducted with the collaboration and coordination of the other European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs), the European Central Bank (ECB), and the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB). [One-off Fit-for-55 climate risk scenario analysis, European Banking Authority](#)

## Questions 52 to 56

### Question 52. Do you have concrete examples of links between banks and NBFIs, or between different NBFIs sectors that could pose a risk to the financial system?

*5000 character(s) maximum*

including spaces and line breaks, i.e. stricter than the MS Word characters counting method.

Interconnectedness is a key factor in assessing systemic risk. In this context, we refer to an academic study commissioned by EPRA and conducted by Bayes Business School, which examines interconnectedness and systemic risk within the European listed real estate sector:

[https://prodapp.epra.com/media/EPRA\\_Bayes\\_2024\\_Connectedness\\_and\\_Systemic\\_Risk\\_in\\_the\\_European\\_LRE\\_sector\\_1710147224818.pdf](https://prodapp.epra.com/media/EPRA_Bayes_2024_Connectedness_and_Systemic_Risk_in_the_European_LRE_sector_1710147224818.pdf)

**Question 53. What are the benefits and costs of a regular EU system-wide stress test across NBFIs and banking sectors?**

**Are current reporting and data sharing arrangements sufficient to perform this task?**

**Would it be possible to combine available NBFIs data with banking data? If so, how?**

*5000 character(s) maximum*

including spaces and line breaks, i.e. stricter than the MS Word characters counting method.

No specific comments for this question.

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**Question 54. Is there a need for arrangements between NBFIs supervisors and bank supervisors to ensure timely and comprehensive sharing of data for the conduct of an EU-wide financial system stress tests?**

**Please elaborate:**

*5000 character(s) maximum*

including spaces and line breaks, i.e. stricter than the MS Word characters counting method.

No specific comments for this question.

**Question 55. What governance principles already laid out in existing system-wide exercises in the EU, such as the one-off Fit-for-55 climate risk scenario analysis or the CCP stress tests conducted by ESMA, could be adopted in such system-wide stress test scenario?**

**Please elaborate:**

*5000 character(s) maximum*

including spaces and line breaks, i.e. stricter than the MS Word characters counting method.

No specific comments for this question.

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**Question 56. Only for NBFIs and banks: In your risk management practices, do you run stress tests at group level, and do you monitor the level of interconnectedness with (other) NBFIs (within and beyond your own sector; e.g. portfolio overlaps)?**

*5000 character(s) maximum*

including spaces and line breaks, i.e. stricter than the MS Word characters counting method.

No specific comments for this question.

## **6. Supervisory coordination and consistency at EU level**

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A consistent application of macroprudential tools and sufficient coordination among supervisors within the EU, as well as with supervisors in third countries, are key to effective macroprudential policies. Insufficient coordination may lead to instability, driven by fragmentation among national jurisdictions and regulatory arbitrage between NBFIs sectors. This

raises important questions on how to ensure effective coordination among Member States, especially during systemic events affecting more than one Member State, while ensuring autonomy to competent authorities. Sharing data among authorities in charge of macroprudential supervision under the current reporting frameworks is also key, as well as monitoring links with unregulated entities (e.g. family offices, supply chain or real estate finance companies). For instance, supervisory coordination could include more timely use of macroprudential tools to reduce the level of exposure or the excessive leverage.

## 6.1 Open-ended funds (OEFs)

Considering that asset managers operate in multiple countries, often by passporting the same fund or creating funds with similar characteristics in different EU Member States, coordination in the supervisory action and in the use of micro and macroprudential tools is key.

ESMA, together with the ESRB, receive information about NCAs' actions under its remit to monitor, assess and measure systemic risk. For instance, during the COVID-19 crisis, ESMA held bi-weekly meetings and received data voluntarily shared by NCAs to monitor the suspensions, availability, and activation of LMTs, including sharing information on cases with cross-border elements.

Moreover, coordination is crucial for the application of macroprudential tools during crises to prevent additional spillover effects across multiple markets. However, this coordination, engagement with stakeholders and use of macroprudential tools should be agile and of high quality, as fund managers may be fully occupied during times of crisis with managing liquidity under redemption pressures.

### 6.1.1 An enhanced coordination mechanism (ECM) for adoption of macroprudential measures and conflict resolution

Building on the mechanism provided for by Article 25 AIFMD for limits on leverage, an Enhanced Coordination Mechanism (ECM) could be created for the adoption of a list of national macroprudential measures (NMMs) that are applicable to all OEFs or a subset of them. While NCAs could remain responsible for their adoption (this list could include the power to suspend redemption rights, additional liquidity buffers for MMFs, leverage restrictions and so on), they would need to obtain beforehand the opinion of ESMA (after consulting the ESRB) and explain any deviation therefrom. This ESMA opinion could also be addressed to NCAs of other Member States, if the measure would be relevant for more than one Member State. Moreover, ESMA, after consulting the ESRB, could also be given the power to initiate an opinion to a single or multiple NCAs in one or more Member States in relation to the adoption or lack of adoption of a given NMM.

On implementation and conflict resolution in relation to a given macroprudential measure, a better coordination system could include a mechanism whereby the host NCA (on the ground of financial stability risks in a given EU Member State) or ESMA (where financial stability risks may arise for a large number of Member States), after consulting the ESRB, could initiate a procedure to request the home NCA to rectify a potentially inadequate, or introduce a missing macroprudential measure (a similar mechanism like this exists today, under Article 50 AIFMD, but it is limited to the power to suspend redemption rights). ESMA, after consulting the ESRB, could issue an opinion in case the home NCA does not act satisfactorily.

### 6.1.2 Supervisory coordination powers for large asset management companies

ESMA could be given specific coordination powers over large asset management companies, with the day-to-day support and supervision left to NCAs under ESMA guidance. In particular, ESMA could be given enhanced coordination role over the supervision conducted by competent authorities (similar to the ESMA CCP Supervisory Committee model<sup>[3 1]</sup>). This means that NCAs would remain responsible for the supervision of investment funds authorised in their



jurisdiction. However, amongst others, they would need to obtain the opinion of ESMA prior to the adoption of certain decisions and explain any deviation therefrom. ESMA, among other, would be competent to initiate and coordinate Union-wide stress tests, to initiate and conduct peer review analyses of NCAs.

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<sup>30</sup> EMIR 2.2 established the CCP Supervisory Committee within ESMA to prepare draft decisions for adoption by the Board of Supervisors, where ESMA is required to take a decision in relation to EU and third-country CCPs. It is composed of the Chair and the two independent members of the CCP Supervisory Committee, NCAs that supervise CCPs (i.e. not from all Member States) and central banks of issue (the latter non-voting). The supervision of EU CCPs remains with the national supervisors. However, NCAs need to submit their draft decisions (e.g. on authorisation) for an opinion to ESMA, and explain any deviation therefrom. ESMA conducts peer reviews, can initiate and coordinate Union-wide stress tests, etc.

## Questions 57 to 64

### **Question 57. How can we ensure a more coordinated and effective macroprudential supervision of NBFIs and markets?**

#### **How could the role of EU bodies (including ESAs, ESRB, ESAs Joint Committee) be enhanced, if at all?**

#### **Please explain:**

*5000 character(s) maximum*

including spaces and line breaks, i.e. stricter than the MS Word characters counting method.

EPRA emphasises the importance of establishing strong ties with our association to support claims and conclusions regarding the listed real estate sector, particularly in relation to REITs.

During the recent technical workshop organised by the European Commission in May, which aimed to contribute to the debate on macroprudential policies for NBFIs, references were made to commercial real estate and the role of REITs within it. However, confusion has arisen from statements made by the ESRB concerning the role of REITs in the commercial real estate sector.

In light of this consultation, we recommend building and maintaining relevant sector expertise for the future. As the representative voice of European publicly listed property companies, our association possesses the expertise and data necessary to provide valuable insights for these assessments.

Although the format for collaboration has yet to be determined, regular exchanges with European regulatory and policy bodies would enable informed and comprehensive evaluations of our sector.

## **Enhanced coordination mechanism (implementation and adoption of NMMs)**

### **Question 58. How could the currently available coordination mechanisms for the implementation of macroprudential measures for OEFs by NCAs or ESAs (such as leverage restrictions or powers to suspend redemption on financial stability grounds) be improved?**

*5000 character(s) maximum*

including spaces and line breaks, i.e. stricter than the MS Word characters counting method.

No specific comments for this question.

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**Question 59. What are the benefits and costs of introducing an Enhanced Coordination Mechanism (ECM), as described above, for macroprudential measures adopted by NCAs?**

*5000 character(s) maximum*

including spaces and line breaks, i.e. stricter than the MS Word characters counting method.

No specific comments for this question.

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**Question 60. How can ESMA and the ESRB ensure that appropriate National Macroprudential Measures (NMMs) are also adopted in other relevant EU countries for the same (or similar) fund, if needed?**

*5000 character(s) maximum*

including spaces and line breaks, i.e. stricter than the MS Word characters counting method.

No specific comments for this question.

**Question 61. Are there other ways of seeking coordination on macroprudential measures and possibly of reciprocation?**

**What could this system look like?**

**Please provide concrete examples/scenarios, and explain if it could apply to all NBFIs sectors or only for a specific one:**

*5000 character(s) maximum*

including spaces and line breaks, i.e. stricter than the MS Word characters counting method.

No specific comments for this question.

### **Supervisory powers of EU bodies**

**Question 62. What are the benefits and costs of improving supervisory coordination over large (to be defined) asset management companies to address systemic risk and coordination issues among national supervisors?**

**What could be ESMA's role in ensuring coordination and guidance, including with daily supervision at fund level?**

*5000 character(s) maximum*

including spaces and line breaks, i.e. stricter than the MS Word characters counting method.

No specific comments for this question.

**Question 63. What powers would be necessary for EU bodies to properly supervise large asset management companies in terms of flexibility and ability to react fast?**

**Please provide concrete examples and justifications.**

*5000 character(s) maximum*

including spaces and line breaks, i.e. stricter than the MS Word characters counting method.

No specific comments for this question.

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**Question 64. What are the benefits and costs of having targeted coordinated direct intervention powers to manage a crisis of large asset management companies?**

**What could such intervention powers look like (e.g. similar to those in Article 24 of EMIR)?**

*5000 character(s) maximum*

including spaces and line breaks, i.e. stricter than the MS Word characters counting method.

No specific comments for this question.

## **6.2 Other NBFIs and markets**

Fostering coordination among EU authorities (ESRB, ESMA, EIOPA and EBA, as well as ECB and the Single Supervisory Mechanism) and between EU authorities and national macroprudential authorities in macroprudential oversight is important due to the complexity of NBFIs and the markets in which they operate, as well as the involvement of multiple supervisors across sectors. More coordination may imply mechanisms to coordinate and provide guidance

for the adoption and implementation of macroprudential measures, but also executing and overseeing stress tests, and guiding national macroprudential authorities in data collection. The mechanism could be designed as the enhanced coordination mechanism (ECM) described in section 6.1 (for insurance and pension funds that mechanism could be managed by EIOPA). Alternatively, NMMs could be also subject to an ex-ante objection procedure by the European Commission, based on the opinions of the ESRB and ESMA/EIOPA.

In commodities markets, moreover, there is the additional complexity due to the interlinkages between spot and derivatives markets. This consultation paper wants to explore whether a more integrated system of supervision that is able to supervise both physical and financial infrastructure of the commodity futures exchange is needed. For instance, the delivery rules of commodities exchanges are key for physical-futures price convergence of benchmark front-month forward contract prices (and so for the price of futures contracts) in a large number of (storable) commodities markets.

## Questions 65 to 68

**Question 65. What are the pros and cons of extending the use of the Enhanced Coordination Mechanism (ECM) described under section 6.1 to other NBFIs sectors?**

### Question 65.1 Please explain what are the pros?

*5000 character(s) maximum*

including spaces and line breaks, i.e. stricter than the MS Word characters counting method.

No specific comments for this question.

### Question 65.2 Please explain what are the cons?

*5000 character(s) maximum*

including spaces and line breaks, i.e. stricter than the MS Word characters counting method.

No specific comments for this question.

## ESAs and ESRB's powers during emergency situations

**Question 66. What are the benefits and costs of gradually giving ESAs greater intervention powers to be triggered by systemic events, such as the possibility to introduce EU-wide trade halts or direct power to collect data from regulated entities?**

**Please justify your answer and provide examples of powers that could be given to the ESAs during a systemic crisis:**

*5000 character(s) maximum*

including spaces and line breaks, i.e. stricter than the MS Word characters counting method.

No specific comments for this question.

### **Integrated supervision for commodities markets**

**Question 67. What are the benefits and costs of a more integrated system of supervision for commodities markets where the financial markets supervisor bears responsibility for both the financial and physical infrastructure of the commodity futures exchange, including the system of rules and contractual terms of the exchange that regulate both futures and (cash/physical) forward contracts?**

*5000 character(s) maximum*

including spaces and line breaks, i.e. stricter than the MS Word characters counting method.

No specific comments for this question.

### **International coordination**

## Question 68. Are there elements of the FSB programme on NBFIs that should be prioritised in the EU?

### Please provide examples:

*5000 character(s) maximum*

including spaces and line breaks, i.e. stricter than the MS Word characters counting method.

No specific comments for this question.

## Annex: Overview of tools for NBFIs with a macroprudential function in EU legislation

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You will find a [preliminary list of macroprudential tools for NBFIs in the annex to the consultation document](#).

### Additional information

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Should you wish to provide additional information (e.g. a position paper, report) or raise specific points not covered by the questionnaire, you can upload your additional document(s) below. **Please make sure you do not include any personal data in the file you upload if you want to remain anonymous.**

The maximum file size is 1 MB.

You can upload several files.

Only files of the type pdf,txt,doc,docx,odt,rtf are allowed

**e111165b-83d8-42f2-bee6-71a16e98cdd2/Annex\_1\_-\_Overview\_updated\_data\_set.pdf**

**b354a034-395e-4285-a821-458136c3af89/Annex\_2\_-\_**

**\_Comparative\_summary\_table\_of\_European\_REIT\_regimes\_2024.pdf**

## Useful links

[More on this consultation \(https://finance.ec.europa.eu/regulation-and-supervision/consultations-0/targeted-consultation-assessing-adequacy-macroprudential-policies-non-bank-financial-intermediation\\_en\)](https://finance.ec.europa.eu/regulation-and-supervision/consultations-0/targeted-consultation-assessing-adequacy-macroprudential-policies-non-bank-financial-intermediation_en)

[Consultation document \(https://finance.ec.europa.eu/document/download/ddd6c515-3796-4db3-b91d-88a1a64acf07\\_en?filename=2024-non-bank-financial-intermediation-consultation-document\\_en.pdf\)](https://finance.ec.europa.eu/document/download/ddd6c515-3796-4db3-b91d-88a1a64acf07_en?filename=2024-non-bank-financial-intermediation-consultation-document_en.pdf)

[More on macroprudential policies for non-bank financial intermediation \(NBFi\) \(https://finance.ec.europa.eu/capital-markets-union-and-financial-markets/financial-markets/macroprudential-policy/macroprudential-policies-non-bank-financial-intermediation-nbfi\\_en\)](https://finance.ec.europa.eu/capital-markets-union-and-financial-markets/financial-markets/macroprudential-policy/macroprudential-policies-non-bank-financial-intermediation-nbfi_en)

[Specific privacy statement \(https://finance.ec.europa.eu/document/download/9bc66a3b-2fb3-4340-a268-9d46aade55f7\\_en?filename=2024-non-bank-financial-intermediation-specific-privacy-statement\\_en.pdf\)](https://finance.ec.europa.eu/document/download/9bc66a3b-2fb3-4340-a268-9d46aade55f7_en?filename=2024-non-bank-financial-intermediation-specific-privacy-statement_en.pdf)

## Contact

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